Rhode Island College

Digital Commons @ RIC
Faculty Publications

4-2004

Traces of the Stillborn?
Richard R. Weiner
Rhode Island College, rweiner@ric.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ric.edu/facultypublications
Part of the International Relations Commons, Models and Methods Commons, and the Political
Theory Commons
Citation
Weiner, Richard R., "Traces of the Stillborn? " (2004). Faculty Publications. 252.
https://digitalcommons.ric.edu/facultypublications/252

This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ RIC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ RIC. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@ric.edu.

TRACES OF THE STILLBORN?:
THE GOVERNANCE OF THE RULE OF SOCIAL LAW
Richard R. Weiner
Dean of the Faculty of Arts & Sciences,
and Professor of Political Science
Rhode Island College
Providence, Rhode Island 02908
rweiner@ric.edu
Presented at the
History Matters Conference,
New School University,
New York New York (24 April 2004)

The architect Daniel Libeskind has written a noted lecture, “Traces of the Unborn.”
We might add, “Traces of the Stillborn.” There is a tendency in historical
institutionalism (HI) to concentrate on the retrieval of traces of paths taken rather than
(1) to consider the processes involved in the selection of paths; and (2) to reflect upon
the conditions of institutional emergence and sedimentation of paths, whether taken or
untaken. Contrary to the path-dependency obsessed historical institutionalism of a
Paul Pierson, this paper stresses the significance of historical case studies of
institutional emergence in the earlier 20th century and their diremptive role within an
unfolding genealogy of knowledge--what Foucault referred to as “effective
history/critical history.” A more critically oriented historical institutionalism journeys
into the interior of institutions beyond “interestedness” toward “committedness,”
toward the endogenous emergence of the argumentative logic of a mode of
legitimation.
The traces of the not yet or not fully born reveal the case of the law creating capacity
of autonomous collective associations. They shape their own autonomous domains
heteronomously, institutionalizing collective rationalities - -institutionally separated,
but recursively and complementarily connected to each other within a network. Such
institutional emergence in practice reflects liberalism’s inability to grasp the
constitutive quality of collective life first provoked at the beginning of the 20th
century by organized/monopoly capital, and today under the compression of
globalized capital. How does liberalism cope with pluralism? How does it do so
beyond the legacy of premodern guild and collegial institutional forms?

I
Post-liberal conceptions of governmentality, jurisprudence and institutional justice
emerged capable of providing a new substantive institutional foundation for the new
autonomous collective associations that transcended and surpassed the classical
liberal values privileging private property. These institutional conceptions
supplemented traditional liberal ones, but also built in democratizing institutional
practices within the governance autonomous collective associations. Beyond private
law welfare jurisprudence, emerged the governance of social law in the
experimentation of the Weimar Republic.
Conventional American and British political science have long taught us of the viral
shades represented in Weimar Republic efforts at democracy. Any remnants of
ghosts of Weimar needed to be exorcised in the building of modern industrial
democracy. However, in the past years, English-speaking audiences have been
reawakened to those Weimar efforts by histories of political and legal thoughts of the
likes of Franz Neumann and Hermann Heller. These have been provided by Bill
Scheuerman, David Dyzenhaus and Peter Caldwell. These historical retrievals
suggest an immanent tradition of social law and social rights associated with the
struggle to develop labor law, complementary institutions of collective bargaining,
and institutional guarantees regarding education, the family, health, work and
codetermination. In an epoch of NeoLiberal undermining of the institutions
democratic movements constituted, should these Weimar efforts at creative
constructivist and reflexive jurisprudence be exorcised? Or rather adjured to as an act
of recommitment? Can these Weimar traces of the commitment to the governance of
social law and social rights be seen as traces of the not yet born, rather than of the
stillborn?
Peter Caldwell notes, in his critique of Scheuerman, that the term Social Rechtsstaat
(Sozialer Rechtsstaat) was a term used by Hermann Heller; and that it is best
translated into English as the Rule of Social Law--or the Governance of Social Law-rather than the “Social Rule of Law” State. Further, beyond the inter-individual
prerogative contract of laissez-faire liberalism, social law covers the collective
constitutive contract based on multipartite consultations, bargaining and negotiation-one which established a scheme of internal governance and autonomous moral/power
resources, as well as a capacity for collective action.
This trace of the stillborn was generated out of the violent class struggles of mutinous
sailors’ councils outside Kiel in 1918 as well as workers’ councils springing up in
Berlin. Out of these violent struggles, the jurist Hugo Preuss inserted key clauses on
social rights, works councils. Labor law and self-constituting social law into the
Weimar Republic Constitution.
At the end of October 1918, sensing the First World War was lost, sailors of the
German High Sea Fleet refused to obey orders to sail against the British Fleet. Their
revolutionary insurbordination caught fire. By 4 November, rioting sailors took
control of Kiel and together with dockers formed an Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council
with revolutionary powers. By 7 November, the whole fleet joined the Council
Movement.
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On the 10th of November 1918 - - a day after the Kaiser’s abdication and the end of
imperial rule, a day before the Armistice - - the Berlin Workers’ and Soldiers’
Council meeting in the Busch Circus and acting as the representatives of all
revolutionary workers and soldiers in the Reich, proclaimed a republican system of
government. Parliamentary socialist leaders like Friedrich Ebert and Philipp
Schneidemann forestalled a proclamation of either a “socialist republic” or a “republic
of councils.” An Action Committee of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council was
named to keep watch over the republican government. Five days later, Hugo Stinnes,
leader of the employers’ trade association, and Carl Legien, leader of the trade union
confederation agreed to establish a “collectivist” system of labor-management
arbitration committees, in which trade unions would be given full recognition. The
agreement was one of many seen as treaties of the organized versus Bolshevism,
against a movement of workers’ councils (Rate) that challenged employer prerogative
and sought a democratic restructuring of capitalism starting from the workplace, and
extending throughout the society. It was the time when a social democratic
government had the power to decree extensive nationalization, to socialize the mode
of production.
In the months following, the future of Germany to a large extent lay in the hands of
these conflicting political and industrial organizations of the labor movement.
Starting in December, paramilitary groups in Berlin (e.g.) (The Free Corps) acting in
behalf of the republican government engaged in bloody street battles with council
supporters.
As Charles S. Maier notes, in Reshaping Bourgeois Europe (1975) what would result
was not a socialist recasting of politico-economic forces, but a corporatist one.
Leaders of the traditional organizations of German labor, the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) and the trade unions, jealous of their newly won privileges, preferred to share
their corporate influence with management representatives on parity committees to
any sense of proletarian socializing power. For six months these newly legitimated
social partners sought to contain the unorthodox extra-parliamentary organization and
methods of independent movement for direct workers’ representation.
By January 1919, the extreme left-wing of the councils movement led the Spartacus
rising for a Republic Council. The revolt was crushed; Spartakist leaders Rosa
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknicht were murdered by soldiers of the Free Corps. As the
workers’ and soldiers’ councils were being broken by the government and paramilitary troops acting on orders of the SPD coalition, focus shifted to factory councils
and workers’ chambers as transforming agents of workers’ control. Such organs were
intended to make workers participant in the overseeing and planning of production.
An immanent tradition of social rights and social law was developed by what Claus
Offe refers to as the “Lawyers Socialism” of Neumann and Heller. This tradition and
its advocates met the violent reaction of fascism. Yet under the leadership of
Neumann after 1945, the tradition was resurrected in the Bonn Republic Constitution.
Today, the tradition confronts the violence of hegemonic NeoLiberalism as the
Schroder Coalition Government attempts to maintain social rights and social law
amidst the demographic and fiscal pressures of 21st century advanced industrial
society that shapes the Berlin Republic.
A focus on social law centers on the law creating capacity of autonomous collective
associations. They shape their own autonomous domains heteronomously,
3

institutionalizing collective rationalities – institutionally separated, but recursively
and complementarily connected to each other within a network. Such institutional
emergency in practice reflects liberalism’s inability to grasp the constitutive quality of
collective life first provoked at the beginning of the 20th century by
organized/monopoly capital, and today under the compression of globalized capital.
How does liberalism cope with pluralism? How does it do so beyond the legacy of
premodern guild and collegial institutional forms?
The genealogy of a German critical sociology of law associated with the governance
of social law. Institutions position subjects ideationally. And the institutionalizing of
socially accountable private law as well as of social law and social rights occur within
an institutional context of the rule of law. Unlike private property rights, these new
institutional practices were the result of ongoing negotiated processes. What
Lehmbruch (1996, 1998) labels Negotiated Democracy (Verhandlungsdemokratie).
This focus is described somewhat by Oliver Gerstenberg in his recent 2001/2002
articles – “Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional Idea for Europe?” (coauthored with Charles Sabel) forthcoming in Academy of Law, XIth Session, Oxford
Univ. Press; and “Denationalization and the Very Idea of Democratic
Constitutionalism: The Case of the European Community, “Ratio Juris, v. 14, n. 3
2001 (298-325). Gerstenberg in the latter (p. 320, fn. 21) cites Harold Laski and
Georges Gurvitch in the first half of the 20th century as parallel “social law”
sociology with a focus on law “emergent” from a pluralism of groups – a tradition
nodded at by Robert Dahl in his 1950-1990 work on the heteronomy of polyarchy, ,
i. e., how a pluralism of groups coordinated its democratically created policies
without falling prey to the Michelsian “iron law of oligarchy.” The focus is on
autonomous subsystems of governance, the decentralized multiplicity of spontaneous
communication processes.
The legal theorist Guenther Teubner - who has followed his social law predecessors
at the London School of Economics, Otto Kahn Freund and Lord Wedderburn –
reflects to such a non-oligarchic horizontal coordination as “hetarchy.” This
amounts to a pluralization of deliberative democracy within the autonomous lawmaking of a decentered society – either within national borders, or in the case of the
European Union across borders. Significantly, a good deal of focus on the
governance of social law and polyarchy traditions are in present day European Union
studies. Gerstenberg associated the governance of social law tradition with nineteenth
century syndicalism (Proudhon, Blanc, Pelletier) and its more functionalist/corporatist
reinterpretation in the twentieth century (Durkheim,Gurvitch, Lehmbruch). He tries
to move beyond this tradition, associating it with corporatist blockages and oligarchic
short-circuiting of grass roots democratic experimentation.
Alongside the social law tradition, Gerstenberg describes Teubner’s
polycontexturality approach as a systems theory approach to emergent “heterchical
yet interconnected network-type linkage at the level of organizations and
professions.” This approach is seen as less functionalist and coordinated than
corporatism, but Gerstenberg sees it as focusing more on a created circuitry of pathdependency than on democratic path-shaping. Teubner looks to a multiplicity of subsystemic subconstitutions, where private law is constitutionally constrained to take of
its diverse social systemic context (hence polycontexturality).
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Gerstenberg, along with Charles Sabel, eschew both corporatist functionalism and
the autopoesis of sub-systems networking for the pragmatism of what they label grass
roots democratic experimentation. They focus – along with Archon Fung and
Michael Dorf – on “bootstrapping” local autonomous deliberative democracy into a
“horizontal” coordination and monitoring procedure that preserves an emphasis on
citizen democratic deliberation both within the public sphere and private
organizations.
What all approaches share is a commitment to practices producing and reproducing
more social egalitarianism, more participatory democracy within economic
organizations and the workplace, and more of a pluralistic sensitivity to difference
and the social byproducts and consequences of economic life. And these
commitments are understood as complementary to liberal notions of contract and
property freedoms, but within a context of social choices and social responsibility.
Franz Neumann (1900-1954) used the notion of “the governance of the rule of law”
as the form to mediate the convergent genres of his two mentors, Otto von Gierke
and his London School of Economics (LSE) tutor Harold Laski: i.e. the Continental
European traditions of Rechsstaat and Genossenschaft (fellowship associations) with
the Anglo-Saxon tradition of “the rule of law.” The concept of a social Rechtsstaat
derives from the collective bargaining agreement’s overcoming the prerogative
contract associated with the master/servant relation and establishing a framework of
internal self-governance herein alternative norms other than the liberal institution of
property are understood as supportive of autonomy. It is distinct from the Liberal
Rechtsstaat of Kant and Weber and the Social State of state-administered social
benefits we come to identify with the Keynesian Welfare State. As we have backed
into a NeoLiberal Rechtsstaat notion these past two decades, the path left open is to
once more explore the Social Rechtsstaat: a relation of state and civil society assuring
autonomous institution of self-critical governance for diverse domains, reflexively
responsible both within institutional spheres and between institutional spheres. This
is the theoretical mission of the present day London School of Economics (LSE)
troika of Anthony Giddens, Gunther Teubner and Ulrich Beck, and follows in a less
skeptical Michelsian manner the pioneering sociology of Philip Selznick and SM.
Lipset.
The governance of social law is understandably a precondition for the rule of
democratic law. Social rights assure individual enjoyment of primordial liberal rights.
The Social Rechtsstaat is more self-binding than the interventionist Sozial Staat (or
Wohlfahrtstaat). And it is an institutional precondition for actualizing the Democratic
Rechtsstaat in modern (or late modern) capitalism. See Figure 1 directly below.
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A postliberal form such as the Social Rechtsstaat model is oriented to setting up
institutions of moral discipline (i.e., governance) which can make us autonomous/selfdetermining citizens enjoying basic rights. They organize state/civil society relations
into a coherent system of normative discourse of constitutive and regulative and
institutionalizing practices.
Rechtsstaat denotes law having rational and secular justification associated with a
state or sovereign, as distinguished from premodern notions of traditional law,
institutes of “organic” orders, or Natural Law. Rechtsstaat is a continental European
tradition and different from the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the “Rule of Law”
associated with parliamentary supremacy and the genesis of law in the representatives
of citizens. Neumann used the term “governance of the rule of law” as the form
mediating these two convergent genres. And in his own attempts to deal with the
pluralist implications of Gierke and his mentor at the London School of Economics
Harold Laski, there is a fruitful tension in appreciating the extent to which phenomena
called “state” or “sovereign” operates within a realm of legality, accountability, an
independent judiciary, and a neutral and predictable set of procedures for applying the
law. Law cannot be normless nor cannot be formless. The state is able through its
sovereign to create and change the substance of the law. At the same time, the
societal sphere is protected against state intervention by (1) rights explicit or implicit
constituted by human beings, (2) general norms and (3) the postulate of the
“generality of law.”
For Neumann, the governance of social law remained the unfinished project of the
Rule of Law, the metaphysical functional equivalent of Natural Law, and the vital
undercurrent in social democratic thinking latently present within the stronger statist
and regulation-centured socialist mainstream. It is historically more closely tied to
the legal practices associated with syndicalism and the trade union movement than to
the ideological or theoretical activities oriented toward political parties. The
generation of collective bargaining agreements, labor courts, and works communities
are but a historical instance of the governance of social law. Individual contractbased law is challenged, and private property rights are adapted to “social ordering”
- - a constitutional ordering of the economy and society. This is an institutionalizing
discourse bent on actualizing the substance of social egalitarianism, and serving as
corrective and alternative norms and forms vis-á-vis the liberal institutions of property
are not the only ones than can support autonomy.
The social law tradition and concept of Social Rechtsstaat captures best the approach
of Hugo Sinzheimer (1875-1945). Making use of the Genossenchaft theory of Otto
Gierke, Sinzheimer challenged the “concession theory” of legal groups of German
positive and Roman law. Like Frederick Maitland, John Figgis, and Harold Laski in
England, Sinzheimer argued that social groups are “organic entities, autonomously
capable of willing and acting rather than legally fictitious personalities as they were
understood under Roman law. These authentic group personalities make their own
rules - - what Gierke called “social law.” Collective bargaining agreements fit this
new category. Gierke’s theory meant that labor unions as well as employer
associations were legitimate groups with rights and duties. These groups could speak
through their own organs in ways determined by their own internal rules, that is, their
own social law takes legal priority over the simple individual labor contract. Beyond
the inter-individual prerogative contract of laissez-faire liberalism, social law covers
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the collective constitutive contract based on multipartite consultations, bargaining and
negotiation - - one which established a scheme of internal governance and
autonomous moral/power resources, as well as a capacity for collective actions.
This Weimar generated critical sociology of law tradition speaks to an American New
Deal context wherein legislation like the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National
Labor Relations Act, and the Social Security Act were written in the language of
private law norms. Such legislation was constituted in terms of a sense of
entrepreneurial individuals’ respective responsibilities, rather than in terms of the
political economy of social citizenship connected to Continental European and
Skandinavian welfare states.
A neglect of this key difference often blocks the English-speaking from
understanding the sensibilities of European social democracy. It is ironic that the
perceived failures of New Deal generated social rights - - one tied to a private law
welfare jurisprudence rather than to some sense of the governance of social law have
been at the heart of the neoliberal assertion in the USA and Britain of market rights to
choose, and the neoliberal emphasis on personal responsibility and initiative.
II
The interest group approach of comparative political sociology in the 1950s and
1960s (Truman, Almond, Latham, Bendix, Coser, Dahrendorf) made no effort to
examine either the objective material conditions or the already regulated or
intersubjectively constituting normative conditions relating to the formation of
interest groups themselves. Stanley Rothman noted four decades ago (1960; 25) what
we want to know, and where David Truman does not help us at all, is why the content
of the political culture that these groups transmit assumes certain forms at certain
times and not at others.
The interest group approach was effectively challenged at the dawn of the 1970s by
the social movement literature of Alain Touraine, Cornelius Castoriadis and Claus
Offe - - specifically on the very process of interest group formation and the creation
of new norms and values. Institutions are understood as playing a mediating role as
mechanisms for regulating conflict - - “mechanisms for arriving at decisions, the
application of which is sanctioned by legitimate authority.” (Touraine, 1977: 178-79;
cf Offe : 54.) This implies that there are operative norms prior to politics, learned
legitimations - - so that “all claims are not negotiable” (Offe 1976 : 43). Touraine
(1977: 196) anticipates historical institutionalism by denoting how social action is
circumscribed by a defined and particular historical context - - one that orients the
field of social relations as well as the stakes in every kind of conflict or negotiation.
The nature of path dependency is heavily influenced by the operative norms set by
politically active members of the society - - i.e., an elite. But Touraine and
Castoriadis pointed to the differing and contradictory role expectations at work in any
instituted configuration - - and that these differences and contradictions do not simply
originate in the operative norms themselves. Discursive traces of alternative
institutionalizing practices are always at work. And these, Touraine notes (362,311)
“overflow the frame in which they appear” and “mobilize demands which cannot be
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entirely satisfied” within the interior arc of subject positions within a preconfigured
regime and its frame of practical reasoning and learning.
Beyond Isaac Balbus’s notion of latent groups and class determinism, there is another
approaching and veering off from Truman. This is now less in terms of class
determinism or epochal/regime periodization - - as in the Regulation Theory approach
(Boyer, Aglietta, Lipietz) - - and possibly more in terms of a transformative
discursive modality detectable within the normative categorials of a predicate logic.
Beyond Truman’s discussion of potential groups, we can focus on potential norms,
emergent institutions.
Beyond the 1970s turning to latent groups, social movements and structured
inequality came respectively an institutionalist and a discursive turn, as political
sociology focused more and more on normative commitment. As Douglas North
noted (1990) institutions were increasingly seen as the missing element in
comprehending the normative framework of cooperative and competitive
relationships.
For the “new institutionalism”of DiMaggio and Powell (1991 :11), institutions were
seen as establishing the very criteria by which people discover their preferences.
Institutions were increasingly seen as constitutive of preference-formation, and not
just as strategic environments within which actors pursue exogenously-given interests.
Much of the new institutionalism was to become preoccupied with a cognitive
bedrock of shared normative constructions - - templates and constructionism became
the hegemonic buzzwords.
The turn toward normative commitment and normative regulation served to
counteract the emphasis on interest aggregation; and - - as Joseph Heath in
Communicative Action and Rational Choice (2001: 309) notes - - “to counteract the
general tendency of human affairs to go very badly when left to self-interest.”
Legitimation was understood in the communications theory of Habermas as the
“warranted assertions of substantive rationality” eschewed by Weber’s rationalization
theory; and bracketed by Mannheim in Ideology and Utopia not as ideational
constructions constitutive of knowledge, but as superstructural illusions materially
produced and periodized. Critical here is the constructionist reprise of the Sociology
of Knowledge approach of Berger and Luckmann as well as of Mannheim.
Habermas’ ongoing project pushed us to recognize how we are socialized to develop a
higher disposition in our practical reasoning, one that enable us to assign normative
reasons priority over the institutional ones . One that enables us to appreciate how we
can distill underlying norms from the institutional context, from their experience as
practices. And in doing so, how to boil off the normative predicate logic of a
substantive rationality.
We are unbracketing legitimation forms that Berger and Luckmann as well as
Mannheim treat sociologically without considering their ontological and
epistemological claims. Legitimations, represent the substance by which our
preferences are ordered. And Habermas’s legitimation theory involves taking up
“warranted assertions” with their “sense of appropriateness” and attendant
constitutive “application discourse” - - all of which are ultimately testable in the
“transcendent discourse” of universalizability/generalizability. (See Klaus Gunther,
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1988). Habermas’ legitimation theory breaks as well with rational choice
institutionalism (RCI) and its preference-hierarchy, transaction cost minimizing
behavior and utility calculi - - which Hall and Soskice (2000) might yield too much
ground to. RCI starts with preferences that are exogenous to a model where all
factors are held constant. Nothing is prior to individual utility calculi. And
institutions are understood as merely vehicles for respective utility maximizations.
RCI cannot account for the social, only what is at base intentional - - only what is
strategic pursuant to exogenously given interests. Again, we return to the
counterpoint - - the discursive approach to the substantive rationale of legitimating
conduct, and its engagement of the instrumental rationale of strategy and preference.
Crucial is the former’s focus on an internalist conception of legitimation. (See
Bernhard Peters, 1996). The constellation of positions within a legitimating argument
is internal to the argument itself. It is an endogenous constellation of positions that a
subject discursively takes in order to redeem normative commitments boiled-off in
unbracketed form from their institutional husks. (See Weinberger, 1991).
The commitments - - i.e., justifications in discoursive theoretical terms - - make
claims upon acting subjects. They exist independently of the acting subjects. Not just
as a legacy or an institutional supply of justification, but as a trajectory with
semblances and traces along an arc of subject positions. This internalist trajectory is
itself a contingent byproduct of accumulating social conflict and cooperation. The
trajectory and its arc - - which characterize the endogenous constellation of subject
positions within normative argument - - moves us to an evaluation of possible
normative alternatives.
Thinking in terms of constellations, trajectories and arcs enable us to see how
legitimating claims and strategies exist independently of actors and are drawn upon by
actors. As Andrew Sayer (2000a:34) reminds us, “(T)he political discourse exists as
it is regardless of whether I study it and whatever I think of it.” The dynamic of the
constellation of discourse is something acting subjects internally (endogenously)
participate in and constitute as they go along. As Judith Butler notes, the constellation
is constituted as we interrogate it. Our contingent articulation involves less a
functional playing of roles, and more of an authorial interpreting and infusing of roles
with our instituting imaginary. (See here Cornelius Castoriadis, 1987 and David
Runciman, 1997). The constellation comprises a predicate logic - - with warrant
predicates and truth predicates; with assertoric claims and validity claims; and with
application discourse and generalizability discourse. (See Heath, 2001, and Gunther,
1988). Beyond Truman, the nature of our on-going willingness to “play by the rules”
is subject to positioned criteria of warranted assertability. These criteria, claims of
rightness and their propositional content are reflexively reconstructable - - rationally
reconstructable - - as Habermas labels this internal constellation of normative
commitment and attendant argument. They are rationally reconstructable as
unfolding normativity.
This is not just a bounded rationality of recombinatory elements, but an imaginative
projecting of a growing rationality (Joas, 200A, 200b, 1993). This is an imaginative
projecting and reconstructing that enables us to recognize the new - - that is, the
“novel” - - within an institutional trajectory. It is also an explaining of (1) either
institutional stability; or (2) how ideas about institutional change or transformation fit
into a hermeneutical circle of argumentation and interpretation - - an endogenous
10

source of change within a constellation of discourse. They do not merely fit within
pre-existing institutions - - their tree-like roots, and their capillary growth of outcome
paths. “Ideas provide the point of mediation between actors and their environment”
(Hay 2001: Chapter 5). The subject actors’ point of access to their densely structured
context is irreducibly ideational - - and discursive.
Jessop’s “strategic-relational approach” melds well with path dependency HI. Within
a given specific context, there is an unevenly distributed configuration of opportunity
and constraint for subject actors. And along with it a structural “strategic
selectivity,” that is, only certain specific paths of strategic action are available, and
only some of these are likely to be actualized in actors’ intentionality. As in RCI,
only some actors “read” the paths effectively - - but this is so as a result of there not
being the perfect information assumption “all things being equal” in much
neoclassical economics and rational choice theory. Hay modifies Jessop, by stressing
how actors without complete information need to interpret the world on the basis of a
constellation of ideas in order to orient themselves strategically, to reflexively monitor
both the context and consequences of their actions. Thus there is as well a
“discursive selectivity” derived not from material structure, but from the claims and
frames yielded in an interrogation of the constellations of interpretation and
argumentation that function as cognitive filters, embedded and growing within
institutions - - that function as the language of a text, a narrative about structured
material inequality, latent groups as well as normative commitment. The claims and
frames are yielded in the strategies which subject actors devise as a means to: (1)
realize their intentions upon a material context which favors (“selects”) certain
strategies; and (2) accommodate their normative commitments in so doing. This is
not idealism, but an ideational accessing with both the material and normative
context. This is not the longings of desire or the imposition of cognition; rather, it is
an engaging of the discursive with the material environment, not a dissolving.
This is a relating of a theory of institutions to a theory of normative unfolding. This is
as a substantive theory and not merely a proceduralist formalism, not s an essentialist
mythic/mystic narrative of some inherent national ordering. Two decades of
sympathetic critics - - such as Klaus Hartmann, Ota Weinberger and Ottfried
Hoffe - - have urged Habermas to grasp the need for a theory of institutions which he
could ground his discourse theory in - - as a theory of Institutional Normativism (IN).
What historical institutional (HI) finds in the institutional trajectory of unfolding
normativity and its arc of subject positions is not idealism but discursive selectivity - one which remains in dialectical tension with the exogenous structural selectivity of
material incentive and opportunity structures. This results in a constant dialogic
tension confronting the discursive theoretical terms of an HI modified by
communications theory into a theory of legitimation we will call Critical
Institutionalism (CI). This is a dialogic tension with the strategic opportunism
inherent in RCI and evolutionary institutional economics. Habermas helps HI with its
persistent troubles with ideas, the constellation of legitimating, and normative
commitment. On the other hand, HI poses a final “way out” to Habernas’s persistent
and unnecessarily confining problem of equating strategy with ultimately utility-based
technique and purely instrumental reasoning.
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III
“Critical Theory redeems past hope in the name of the future by revealing the as yet
unrealized potentials of the present” (Benhabib, 1981: 58-59). It asks to what extent
sedimented and floating signifiers have not yet delivered on their promise of a
substantive order. Unlike the Sociology of Knowledge of Karl Mannheim or Berger
and Luckmann, critical theory does not deny the immanent development and
affirmation of changed and new forms - - changed and new conceptual mediations of
social reality - -- as a process of knowledge driven by an inner dialectic, as an
unfolding of categorial analysis whose immanent predicate logic provides the basis
for critique.
Critical Theory is a theory of legitimation as rational aspiration. It uncovers and
measures its utopian content - - the substance of the organizing principles embedded
within its worldview (Weltanschaung), its mental model. Critical Theory tests the
warranted assertions and truth claims of legitimations inherent within an institutional
legacy, an institutional trajectory, and the arc of an institution’s anticipated horizon
(or constellation). It is a form of self-reflective knowledge in itself. (See Geuss,
1981: 95, 88, 59).
A theory of legitimation is grounded in actors’ valuation of what is right. And the
more ideational institutionalism we have posed reflects the tradition of
institutionalism as institutional embodiment of normative substance, rather than the
tradition of evolutionary institutional economics. It is legitimated intersubjectivity as
a substance with its own internal principles - - its own entelechies. (See Massimo
LaTorre, 1999).
Historical institutionalism (HI) complemented by the theory of legitimation can
account for this ideational foundation of institutions (Thelan). Part of the gap in HI
results from the fact that practicing political sociologists - - often by training - skeptical or dismissive of the possibility of any rational grounding for unfolding
normativity (Beetham).
A substantive understanding of institutionalism is one that fills gaps, aporias (in both
Derrida’s and Benhabib’s terms), and situations of undecidability with semblances
(Adorno), iterable traces or spectral presences (Derrida). And a Critical
Institutionalism (CI) resulting from the grounding of Habermas’s brand of critical
theory as discourse theory in a theory of institutions resists the gapless normativismof
a Kelsen or a Langdell, it as well resists the equally positivist imprinting of the black
letter law without recourse to Natural Law. Note Figure 2 below, as adapted from
Paulson (1992).
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FIGURE 2
LAW AND FACT
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INSTITUTIONALIST
THEORY OF LAW

4

Neil MacCormick
&Ota Weinberger
beyond Emile Durkheim

EMPIRICO-POSITIVIST
THEORY OF LAW
John Austin
& H.L.A. Hart

In confronting the NeoLiberal challenge to all forms of sociality/solidarity, such a
critical institutionalism would follow Richard Fallon in probing the inherent
intelligibility within the fluidity of constructivist norm creation beyond the narrower
interpretive mode of Richard Epstein and Antonin Scalia. Substantive design by
constituting interpretive communities displaces individualist formalized law.
The CI developed here evaluates the forms by which societies evaluate themselves,
that is, the formal ordering of what Ottfried Hoffe has referred to as “Institutional
Justice.” Hoffe understands a juridico-discursive order in the “discourse theoretical
terms” of argumentative forms, rather than in an engagement with chimerical
counterfactuals. These argumentative forms serve as the vehicles by which we extend
the institutionalizing dialogue of deliberative justification into the marketplace and
civil law as governmentality - - governance rationales used in practices, rather than
idealizations (chimera). This involves discourses answering practical questions - and with it a discursive selectivity testing for the dialogic claims of an unredeemed
predicate logic, beyond the functional sociological compliance and justification of a
strategic selectivity.
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Critical institutionalism as a capstone to historical institutionalism (HI) can be
understood as an internalist principled game, a language game
•

wherein norms rather than some mythic/mystic substance is experienced as
Inner institutional morality (Hermann Heller),

•

wherein deliberation defines its own guiding norms and practices as an
institutionalizing governance rationale (Jurgen Habermas),

•

wherein norms are not understood as objects of pure cognition, but as
values we commit ourselves to in our practices: (Georges Gurvitch); and

•

wherein norms emerge as the socially shared solutions to problems and as
byproducts of repeated social conflicts - - from which they are transformed
into a constellation of learned normative commitments, revealed as
promises.
(Jack Knight).

Here the “institutional” represents the not-contractual dimension of obligation - - the
shared standards of self-governance, and valuation, the normative commitments and
promises of a “promising game (John Searle) constituted in and through discourse
theoretical terms.
Criticial institutionalism like the “critical history” posed by Michel Foucault and
Mitchell Dean goes beyond posing critical junctures of contingent emergence. It
involves a capacity to engage in interrogation of the internalist principled/promising
game - - wherein discourse is ontologically prior to identity-formation, and legitimacy
is prior to legality. “No individual can choose to stand outside the totality of the
interpretive frameworks of discourse written into our very human condition.” (See
A.M. Smith, 1998) Institutional Justice involves the legitimated ordering of regimes
- - substantively and procedurally - - in terms of formal models of law and political
economy.
Regimes are purposefully created normative frameworks organizing negotiations
among a formally specified set of actors - - an institutional setting within which
negotiations can take place, and both bonding and blind force can be assured. A
regime offers
•

a template of normative understandings’

•

a specific mode of legal discourse corresponding to the logic of
argumentative practices for fair negotiations based on discourse
specific norms

•

a model of institutional justice; and

•

a utopian model for re-visioning practices.
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A regime is an ensemble of constitutive discourse providing the imaginary framework
through which we interpret the symbolic order into which we are drawn, if not
thrown. It is a carrier of institutionalizing practices and governance rationales. And,
as an internal ensemble of discourse generating both legitimation and truth claims, it
is open to interpellation/interrogation. And as Niklas Rose (1996: 60) has noted, it
has been the Right rather than the Left that has managed to articulate a rationality of
governance consonant with a new regime of the self. To a large extent, the regime of
social democracy, while competing rationality with liberalism, is grounded in a liberal
base.
Subject positions - - themselves constituted discursively - - are an ensemble of
interpretative schema responsive to structural positions. They are drawn upon as
legitimating strategies and mark how we experience our structural position within the
social. ( Here see the development of this concept from Gramsci through Althusser
through Laclau and Mouffe). Thus we are not just bearers of supports, but actors who
draw upon a repertoire of discourse resources - - within a discursive structure of
signifiers - - interpretive schema, rights, claims and collective identities tied to subject
positions. We are actors who draw on legitimations of purposive and substantive
argumentation.
Subject position within respective regimes of law and political economy can be
rationally reconstructed in discourse. In doing so the internal relations of an
immanent normative unfolding or a projected re-institutionalizing of practices can be
gauged - - in the discourse theoretical terms of argumentative forms, i.e., discursive
selectivity. Subject positions are more in a condition of floating signifiers that have
not yet delivered on its promises, on its normative commitments, on its reflected
visions. And moving along the interior arc of a regime’s subject positions, we move
beyond the configurative paths, junctures and practices of “effective history”
practiced by HI, toward a “critical history” associated with CI. The latter employs
more of a diremptive approach - - a key phrase from Habermas and ironically Georges
Sorel before him. The diremptive approach attempts to reflect reality at more than
one moment, one instance.
Legitimations are positioned in narratives and worldviews/world picture - - not as
static snapshots, but as panning shots of a regime in motion - - with social movement,
swelling beyond thresholds, and institutional emergence. A diremptive approach
scans a constellation of instances that open up to montage-like presentation
•

where genres return to haunt us not just as memory, but also as
possibility of uncanny actualization; and

•

wherein the future is never either fully determinable or fathomable, but
only grasped and recognized as traces or semblances - - moved by the
necessity of truth, rather than the arbitrariness of ideology - -within
the gaps among the intermittent rhythms, sequences and jumpcuts.

Critical instiutionalism (CI) complements historical institutionalism by keeping us
aware that the swelling of historical movement and change is an instance of
displacement, as much as it is path-dependent. This is the displacement of one
threshold for another. History, Walter Benjamin advised us, is never wrapped into a
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specific moment of a fixed juncture. Rather, it flows in a passage that swells beyond
the limits of its epoch, of its period. It confronts a gap - - or aporia - - and makes up
for it by constituting a canal for the displacement of the swelling (schwelle), a
superimposition of a threshold.
IV
To what extent can liberalism offer a convincing account of the democratic
citizenship adaptable to the provocation of non-statist institutions? Following Laski
rather than Schmitt, sovereignty in the past century reflects social compacts rather
than separate state apparatuses per se. A regime of the Autonomous Social uncoupled
from the State and linked through complementary institutions within civil society is
bent on institutionalizing itself as a form of life, as a postliberal governance rationale.
Following Laski rather than Schmitt,we need to accommodate rather than exorcise a
pluralism of heteronomous regulatives and constitutives. Out of the accelerating
pluralism of the past century, emerges a plan of signifiers in the practical and
discursive struggles of pluralist Social Subjects of Rights rather than the Marxist
monist Social Subject of Rights - - another sense of sovereignty eclipsed. (See
McClure: 1992,1996). The Governance of Autonomous Social Law derives from
deliberation as an effect - - as a discourse finds its own subjects. Such pluralist
deliberation is the source of its legitimation, rather than some higher law or some
gapless system of norms. This trace of a tradition of discourse associated with an
emergent practice and juridification draws on the categorical framing of a democratic
imaginary in its historical struggles and in its immanent potential. (See Castoriadis).
The promise of the signifiers of the Governance of Social Law have only partially
delivered in their promise of a new institutional order. As Adorno notes, the
democratic imaginary seeks traces of a prospect of utopia within a society that
continually betrays it, tracing its own claims which ghost the future.
The practices and forms of the Governance of Social Law can be grasped
categorically as assertional commitments (Brandon), and not counterfactually as
chimera (G.A. Kelly). Chimera are anti-historical. The issue of immanent historical
warrants - - rather than visions of order - - are immanent within the core of practices,
immanent within a regime of discourse whose claims are interrogated/interpellated.
This immanence is inherent in what George Hendrik von Wright would call a quasiteleology of normic statements - - that is, legitimating, propositional claims. A
Critical Institutionalism (CI) goes beyond the Sociology of Knowledge in
unbracketing normative commitments from practices, from their institutional husks.
Categorial form is created in historical time but attains independent validity as the
argument behind an institutionalizing practice is interpellated and gauged. Beyond
the Sociology of Knowledge, Institutional Normativism (IN) starts with a
genealogical study of the evolution of institutional practices as reworkable traces of
affirmative substance, the substance of an emergent form of legitimation. Then IN is
transformed into CI in its interpellation of the legitimating argument itself, which
guides the “imaginary institution of society.”
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Beyond HI, and its focus on path dependency, Critical Theory as CI and “critical
history” understands a process of self-clarification and emergent possibility internal to
a historical process, internal to the argument of normative principles that are the core
of institutional/institutionalizing subjects. Following the anthropologist Mary
Douglas in How Institutions Think (1986), institutions can be conceptualized as
subjects of action, as bearer of practices and their normative claims/commitments. A
Critical Institutionalism looks beyond the “discursive selectivity” of some logic of
appropriateness and the interestedness of actors’ application of that logic, what
Schattschneider once called the “mobilization of bias.” CI looks beyond
“interestedness” toward “commitedness.” In this way CI may have more in common
with Philip Selznick’s “old institutionalism” with its focus on the affirmativity of
institutional commitments as an ontology of institutional facts, rather than the focus of
RCI on “contracting.”
Beyond interestedness and discursive selectivity, we are moved to focus on discursive
commitment itself rather than merely the application of the commitment. We are
moved to a theory of legitimation rather than of interest groups, to a commitedness to
rights and procedures.
Rational Reconstruction can be understood externally/explicitly as the process tracing
of the contingent interaction, the discursive selectivity of policy-makers’ performance
and claims within a path dependent institutional context.
Rational Reconstruction can also be understood as a more internalist/implicit
interpellation of the commitments themselves: their warrants, their propositions, the
arguments immanent within path shaping/institutionalizing practice “boiled off from
their institutional husks.”
Social Subjects of Rights are inscribed in material practice - - not as a system of ideas
in people’s heads, but as material practices existing in people’s conduct according to
their commitments. These material practices can be understood not only in terms of
an ordinary causal emergence reducible to micro-properties, and path dependency
within predetermined paths of appropriateness. These practices can also be
conceptualized in terms of a novel path-shaping and holistic emergency wherein a set
of properties (such as the Governance of Social Law) may be determined by and
dependent on other properties, but not reducible to those others. (See Joas, 1993,
2000a, 2000b; Hasker, 1999: 171-78; Kim, 1993).
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